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Public trust in law enforcement is alarmingly low in many communities nationwide, particularly in those 
experiencing violent crime coupled with intensive police presence. Research shows that positive police-
community relationships are crucial for safer communities: citizens are more likely to engage as 
witnesses and as partners in crime reduction if they believe in the legitimacy of police as equitable and 
impartial agents of the law.1 Yet many community members perceive law enforcement activities to be 
targeted toward—and biased against—nonwhite people.  
Communities wracked by highly publicized shootings of unarmed people of color have called for 
both greater transparency and accountability on the part of the police. Likewise, law enforcement 
executives desire hard metrics on current practices and a way to measure changes in response to 
policies aimed at reducing bias and improving police-community relations.  
This brief aims to address the needs of both communities through collaboration between two 
initiatives: The Center for Policing Equity’s National Justice Database (NJD) and the White House’s 
Police Data Initiative (PDI; see text box). Both NJD and PDI emphasize the importance of collecting and 
making transparent police data to measure fairness and improve policing equity. NJD also emphasizes 
applying a rigorous analytic framework to examination of that data.  
This brief applies the NJD analytic framework to publicly available PDI data. It focuses on the 
Austin Police Department (APD) in Texas, one of the first agencies to make its data available through 
PDI. Importantly, analyses were conducted independent of any law enforcement agency funding. In this 
research brief we present empirical documentation of the degree of racial and ethnic disparities in 
Austin’s policing practices, as well as possible interpretations of such differences. 
Our purpose is to demonstrate what can be learned by thoroughly analyzing democratized data. 
We empirically document the degree of racial and ethnic differences in Austin’s policing practices, as 
well as possible interpretations of such disparities. We hope the brief provides law enforcement officials 
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with a road map for greater transparency and accountability in police practices, so they can transform 
agencies to adopt more just and equitable means of promoting public safety.  
Highlights  
The pages that follow present analyses of APD traffic stops and searches, as well as APD officers’ use of 
force, for the calendar years 2014 and 2015. For both yearly analyses we isolate race and ethnicity, 
exploring differences in practices and modeling these outcomes of interest while controlling for 
competing factors, such as place-specific crime rates. The raw data point to disparate treatment of 
Austin citizens based on race and ethnicity in vehicle stops and in use of force. For use-of-force 
incidents, black and Hispanic communities remain more likely to experience use of force than white 
communities after adjusting for community-level differences in crime and poverty.  
These findings demonstrate that even in an agency such as the APD, which is instituting reforms 
aimed at enhancing equity in policing, unwelcome disparities remain, indicating that more work is 
needed within and beyond law enforcement agencies. Our research also underscores the value of 
rigorous and impartial analysis of police data—together with public dissemination of the findings—as 
well as the importance of continual analyses that can help promote and measure change over time.  
Collaboration between Two Nationwide Efforts to Increase Policing Equity 
Since 2012, the Center for Policing Equity has been working with law enforcement leaders, academics, community 
advocates, and the Department of Justice to create the National Justice Database (NJD), a National Science 
Foundation–supported effort to compile national-level statistics about police behavior and develop a rigorous 
analytic road map for examining police data. NJD’s goal is to independently help police and communities learn 
about disparities in law enforcement and hold departments accountable to them. To date, NJD has received 
commitments from police departments nationwide, serving 25 percent of the United States population; the data, 
however, have yet to be made public. 
Against this backdrop, President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing launched in May 2015 the 
Police Data Initiative (PDI), calling on law enforcement agencies across the country to make data publicly available 
and partner with researchers and technologists to disseminate it. The Police Foundation makes PDI data available 
through a portal on its website (https://publicsafetydataportal.org/). Through such transparency, PDI aims to 
rebuild trust between communities and police and, ultimately, to reduce crime. Thus far, over 100 law enforcement 
agencies have committed to release data files on police actions such as stops, searches, arrests, and uses of force. 
While dozens of agencies and members of the public have accessed these data, few people have analyzed the data. 
Through a collaboration between these two nationwide efforts, this brief demonstrates how the NJD analytic 
framework can be applied to PDI data to identify the presence (or absence) of unwarranted racial disparities in 
officer stops, searches, uses of force, and so forth. This brief also shows how the availability of additional police 
data, advocated by NJD, can increase public knowledge about how to improve policing equity nationwide. 
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The NJD Analytic Framework 
The Austin-specific findings embodied in this brief are an example of the types of questions the NJD 
analytic framework is designed to answer. The framework aims to distinguish among possible 
explanations for racial disparities in policing, of which there are three broad classes: 
1. Disparities that arise from community characteristics. For instance, high crime rates or 
poverty within a community may draw increased police attention. Individuals within the 
community may place disproportionately more calls for service to police. 
2. Disparities that arise from police characteristics. For instance, police may patrol some 
neighborhoods with less commitment to the dignity of those who live there. Or, deploying more 
officers to high-crime neighborhoods may produce disproportionately more interactions 
between police and nonwhite communities.  
3. Disparities that arise from the relationships between communities and police. For instance, 
mistrust of law enforcement may incite some communities to flee approaching officers or resist 
arrest more than other communities do. Similarly, a sense that communities do not trust or 
respect police may cause officers to feel unsafe or defensive in some neighborhoods. 
While the truth likely incorporates elements of each of these explanations, the NJD framework 
allows departments to learn about how all three contribute to racial disparities. By combining police 
administrative data with population data (e.g., income, education, racial demographics), police 
department climate surveys, and community surveys, we can credibly examine the role that each 
explanation plays in the disparities that both police departments and communities want to reduce. 
However, because NJD data on police behavior are neither publicly accessible nor integrated into 
the PDI rubric, this brief carefully analyzes the role that community-level factors play in racial 
disparities—that is, explanation 1.  The resulting analyses can be used to steer community engagement, 
relationship building, and continued department reform. Importantly, the persuasive power of analytics 
grows substantially the longer a department measures and analyzes important indicators. As a result, 
we encourage the APD, the people of Austin, and all PDI-participating communities to see these 
analyses as a first benchmark against which progress can be measured. With many departments set to 
receive similar briefs in the coming years, we hope this analytic framework can be a road map for police 
and communities—establishing where they are now and charting a path toward a more just future. 
In fairness, no police department in the country currently collects all the data recommended in the 
NJD analytic framework (though several departments collect each element of non-survey data). CPE 
and Urban chose the APD as our partners for this brief because its use-of-force dataset is among the 
most comprehensive in the country and is the single most comprehensive publicly available use-of-force 
dataset. In addition to its use-of-force dataset, the APD publishes a dataset on citations and arrests 
resulting from vehicle stops. 
The APD does not publish any officer-level data because of officer privacy considerations; police 
departments rarely make these data public. As a result, we are unable to analyze how much racial 
disparities are attributable to individual officers (compared to the department or the region). The APD 
also does not publish data on complaints against officers, so we are unable to examine racial disparities 
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in complaints using PDI data (Austin’s Office of the Police Monitor publishes an annual report on citizen 
complaints, but these data are not in the PDI portal and thus not subject to analysis here). Additionally, 
though the APD does make its disciplinary matrix and general orders available to the public, these are 
not in the PDI portal, so we do not explore questions about policy comprehensiveness in our analyses. 
The APD documents, but does not publish data on, pedestrian stops or vehicle stops not resulting in 
citation or arrest. As a result, we are unable to ask questions about racial disparities in pedestrian stops, 
and our ability to ask questions about the source of disparities in vehicle stops is limited. We encourage 
the APD to begin data collection of these fields while noting that new data collections are time consuming, 
may lower morale in the short term, and require technical infrastructure to aggregate and analyze. 
The above description of APD’s data holding and publicly available data is offered to demonstrate 
the tremendous opportunity for greater clarity on fairness in policing that could be afforded by further 
democratization of policing data. These opportunities are not for the APD alone but for law 
enforcement agencies nationwide.  
The dashboard on the next page illustrates the types of data that could—and arguably should—be 
collected and disseminated through the PDI portal, whether Austin currently has these data publicly 
available, and how analyses of these data can answer critical questions that can help move the needle in 
reducing racial and ethnicity-based bias in policing and enhancing trust between community members 
and the police. The dashboard is designed to articulate the questions that can be asked of police 
departments using their data as well as community survey data (while the City of Austin conducts an 
annual police satisfaction survey of residents, it is not representative of communities most likely to 
experience violent crime and heavy police presence). The dashboard underscores that because certain 
data are not currently published through the PDI portal several questions in the NJD analytic 
framework cannot be posed and answered. 
Austin Police Department Data 
The Austin Police Department embodies 1,900 
officers serving the 11th-largest city in the United 
States, with 930,000 residents as of 2015. The 
population of the Austin greater metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) is more than double that of the 
city: 2 million residents, many of whom commute into 
Austin daily.  
In this brief, we focus on two types of Austin 
police data made available through the PDI portal: 
vehicle stops that resulted in citation or arrest in 
2015, and incidents involving police use of force in 2014. We show total counts of vehicle stops and use-
of-force incidents and counts by white, black, and Hispanic race and ethnicity. Over half of Austin MSA’s 
residents are non-Hispanic white (53 percent), nearly a third are Hispanic (32 percent), and less than 
one-tenth are non-Hispanic black (7 percent). Because urban centers such as Austin experience an   
Austin, Texas 
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Availability of Austin PD Data to Answer NJD Analytic Questions 
 
Are there 
racial 
disparities? 
How much 
are 
disparities 
attributable 
to officers? 
How well do 
officer-level 
psychologies 
predict 
disparities? 
What 
accounts 
for 
disparities? 
How 
healthy are 
officers? 
How 
comprehensive 
are 
departmental 
policies? 
Administrative Datasets       
Vehicle Stops Moderate Not in PDI Not in PDI       
Pedestrian Stops Not in PDI Not in PDI Not in PDI       
Use-of-Force  Rich Data Not in PDI Not in PDI       
Complaints  Not in PDI Not in PDI Not in PDI       
Crime/Calls        Rich Data     
Officer Discretion     Moderate     
Neighborhood       Rich Data     
Police Climate Surveys       
Psychological Health       Not in PDI   
Physical Health         Not in PDI   
Job Health         Not in PDI   
Policy Analyses         
Racial Equity 
     
Not in PDI 
Trust 
     
Not in PDI 
Reduce Force 
     
Not in PDI 
Thorough 
     
Not in PDI 
Effective 
     
Not in PDI 
influx of regional residents who visit the city for work and recreation, MSA population figures are more 
appropriate measures to adjust police data counts for exposure to different citizens. Racial and ethnic 
differences in police data must also be contextualized with other contributing factors, including level of 
illegal activity, something we model in the use-of-force analysis by using Census tract-level Part I crimes 
as a proxy. 
Vehicle Stops and Searches 
Over time, the volume of vehicle stops in Austin resulting in a citation remained fairly constant, at 
approximately 10,000 stops a month, with one sharp drop during September 2015. The number of  
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FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 
Vehicle Stops Resulting in a Citation, 2015 Vehicle Stops Resulting in an Arrest, 2015 
  
vehicle stops resulting in an arrest was much lower, averaging 750 a month and remaining fairly 
constant across time after peaking in January 2015. 
VEHICLE STOPS BY RACE OR ETHNICITY 
In total, Austin police stopped more white and Hispanic than black drivers in each month of 2015, an 
expected pattern given the higher share of white and Hispanic residents in the Austin metropolitan area. 
However, among stops resulting in a citation, more white than Hispanic drivers were stopped each month, 
while the opposite was true for stops resulting in an arrest. Each month of 2015, a higher number of 
stopped Hispanic drivers were arrested than either white or black stopped drivers. These counts are not 
adjusted for differential rates of driving, involvement in illegal activity, or exposure to police. 
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 
Vehicle Stops Resulting in a Citation by Race Vehicle Stops Resulting in an Arrest by Race 
or Ethnicity, 2015 or Ethnicity, 2015 
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When accounting for underlying population, however, we see that rates of vehicle stops resulting in 
citation or arrest were highest for black drivers throughout the year. In other words, while the fewest 
number of vehicle stops occurred for black drivers, a higher proportion of black people was stopped 
than Hispanic or white people. Similar proportions of white and Hispanic drivers experienced vehicle 
stops resulting in citations, but stop rates resulting in arrests were twice as high among Hispanic drivers 
as white drivers. Again, these rates are not adjusted for differential rates of driving, involvement in 
illegal activity, or exposure to police. 
FIGURE 5 FIGURE 6 
Per Capita Stops Resulting in a Citation by Race Per Capita Stops Resulting in an Arrest by Race 
or Ethnicity, 2015 or Ethnicity, 2015 
  
VEHICLE SEARCHES BY RACE OR ETHNICITY 
Vehicle stops may result in a search following arrest and may precede arrest if reasonably necessary for 
officer protection (e.g., weapons search), there is probable cause of evidence of crime, or upon the 
driver’s consent. Because only 2 percent of APD’s vehicle stops that resulted in a citation involved 
searches, this section focuses on vehicle stops resulting in arrest. 
Three-quarters (76 percent) of APD’s arrest stops involved a vehicle search; of those searches, 77 
percent were described as occurring for reasons “incidental to arrest.” Following Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332 (2009), searches performed incidental to arrest are conducted after an arrest has been made to 
address continuing safety threats or preserve criminal evidence. Searches performed for other reasons 
not incidental to arrest, including for “probable cause,” as a “frisk for safety,” or by driver’s “consent,” are 
assumed to have been conducted before arrest and were subjected to greater officer discretion. We 
focus analysis on these latter searches, which made up 23 percent of those conducted in 2015. 
Focusing on searches not incidental to arrest, Figure 7 shows the percentage of vehicle stops 
resulting in a search, broken down by drivers’ race/ethnicity. In general, search rates were highest for 
stopped black drivers and lowest for Hispanic and white stopped drivers. The search rate for black 
drivers peaked early in 2015 at 32 percent, meaning 1 in 3 stops of black drivers involved a search, and 
was lowest at the end of 2015, when one in six stops (16 percent) of black drivers resulted in a search. 
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Search rates for Hispanic and white drivers were generally similar, averaging 16 percent and 14 percent 
respectively, across the time period. By the end of 2015, the racial gap in percentage of drivers searched 
by race/ethnicity had closed somewhat.  
The APD also records whether contraband (drugs, weapons, cash, alcohol, and “other items”) was 
recovered from vehicle searches. One in three (32 percent) vehicle searches yielded contraband, 
compared with almost half (48 percent) of nonincidental vehicle searches. Figure 8 shows the search 
“hit” rates, or percentage of nonincidental searches resulting in contraband discovery, by race/ethnicity. 
Although hit rates vary, few discernible patterns of differences by race/ethnicity are evident; hit rates 
average 47 percent for Hispanic drivers, 49 percent for black drivers, and 50 percent for white drivers. 
This lack of hit rate differences can typically be interpreted as evidence of lack of bias in decisions to 
stop or search,2 but in this case, because the data include only cases in which arrests were made, we do 
not know the rates at which different groups were searched and contraband was not found. 
Consequently, we cannot draw any conclusions about bias from hit rates among arrest stops. 
Regardless, APD’s hit rates are very high and may be explained, at least in part, by the fact that APD has 
one of the strictest consent search requirements in the country, for which officers must have probable 
cause to conduct a search. These hit rates also appear high because they are limited to stops resulting in 
arrest; other jurisdictions looking at all vehicle stops have found hit rates ranging from 7 percent to 34 
percent.3  
FIGURE 7 FIGURE 8 
Share of Drivers Subject to Nonincidental Searches Nonincidental Search “Hit” Rates  
by Race or Ethnicity, 2015 by Race or Ethnicity, 2015 
  
MODELING OFFICER DISCRETION IN VEHICLE STOPS AND SEARCHES 
In this section, we present analyses that help us explore whether racial disparities in vehicle stops that 
lead to citations and arrests are potentially warranted or unwarranted. First, we examine the role of 
officer discretion in deciding whether to make a stop; second, we model the decision to search a vehicle 
once a stop is made.  
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Officer Discretion. To understand whether racial disparities in officer-initiated (discretionary) stops 
exceed racial disparities in nondiscretionary stops, such as those initiated by citizens through calls for 
service and commission of felony or misdemeanor, we compute the officer discretionary index (ODI) as 
follows: 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂 𝐵𝐵/𝐻𝐻/𝑊𝑊
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂 𝐵𝐵/𝐻𝐻/𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
The ODI compares the proportion of officer discretionary stops of blacks (B), Hispanics (H), and 
whites (W) with the proportion of citizen-initiated stops of the same racial/ethnic group. If a racial 
group’s proportion among officer discretionary stops differs from that among nondiscretionary stops, 
there may be indication of racial bias. A positive (or negative) ODI indicates that officers are initiating 
a higher (or lower) share of stops of that racial or ethnic group than are citizens. A null result (0) 
indicates that officer discretion judgment is on pace with that of citizens. 
For the Austin police data, we examined the reason recorded for making a stop to distinguish 
between officer-initiated (discretionary) and citizen-initiated (nondiscretionary) stops. Discretionary 
stops were defined as those of a “suspicious person,” while nondiscretionary stops were defined as 
those stemming from calls for service or violations of Texas penal code, Austin city ordinance, or the 
Texas water safety act.4 
Table 1 shows the ODIs calculated for blacks, Hispanics, and whites in Austin, based on vehicle 
stops resulting in citation or arrest for 2015. As shown, there is no evidence of racial bias in stops of 
Hispanic drivers. By contrast, among stops resulting in citation or arrest, a higher share of officer-
initiated stops of black drivers was present than citizen-initiated stops of black drivers (the difference is 
higher among stops resulting in arrest). An equivalently lower share of officer-initiated stops of white 
drivers was present than citizen-initiated stops of white drivers.  
TABLE 1 
Officer Discretionary Indices, 2015 
 Stops Resulting in Citations Stops Resulting in Arrests 
 % 
discretionary 
% non-
discretionary ODI 
% 
discretionary 
% non-
discretionary ODI 
Blacks 21 13 0.09 31 19 0.12 
Hispanics 41 41 0.01 38 38 0.00 
Whites 38 47 -0.09 31 43 -0.12 
Note: Discretionary stops are initiated by police officers; nondiscretionary stops are initiated by citizens. 
Decision to Search. To understand officers’ decision to search a vehicle following a stop, we examined 
four possibly predictive factors available in the Austin police data, simultaneously in a logistic 
regression model: driver’s race or ethnicity (black, Hispanic, white), driver’s gender (male, female), 
driver’s age, and whether the officer indicated he or she knew the driver’s race or ethnicity before 
making the stop.5 We also tested the possibility that these factors interacted to predict a decision to 
search. 
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For this model, we again focused on vehicle stops resulting in arrest and on searches that were not 
described as incidental to that arrest. Overall, 23 percent of the arrest stops resulted in a search for 
which the recorded reason was either “probable cause” (18 percent), “frisk for safety” (4 percent), 
“contraband in plain view” (0.5 percent), or driver’s “consent” (0.3 percent). 
In the regression model, drivers’ race/ethnicity and age interacted to predict Austin police officers’ 
decisions to conduct searches on stopped vehicles. This finding remained true after adjusting for 
driver’s gender, whether driver’s race was known before the stop, and an interaction between driver’s 
gender and age. Figure 9 graphs the model-estimated probabilities that a vehicle would be searched by 
drivers’ race/ethnicity and age. Three findings are noteworthy: 
• Stopped black drivers of all ages had the highest probabilities of vehicle search. 
• Stopped, young Hispanic drivers had the second-highest probability (.26) of vehicle search, at a 
rate comparable to that of older black drivers (.25). 
• Age-related reductions in the probabilities of vehicle search were greater for stopped white 
and Hispanic drivers than for black drivers. 
We also noted (but did not graph) that the estimated probabilities of vehicle search were higher 
when the driver’s race was known before a stop (.30 compared with .19) and for younger male (.28) than 
older female drivers (.15). These findings were included as controls in the model.  
FIGURE 9 
Probability of Vehicle Search by Age and Race or Ethnicity, 2015 
 
Source: Logistic regression model predicting vehicle search, among 7,870 APD vehicle stops ending in arrest in 2015.  
Note: Model included drivers’ race, age, gender, whether race was known before the stop, and interactions between race and age 
and between age and gender. 
This model provides insight into the relative importance of different factors in predicting Austin 
officers’ decision to conduct a vehicle search on stops ending in arrest, but is unable to control for 
drivers’ differential involvement in illegal activity or exposure to police.  
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Use-of-Force Incidents 
Next, we examined APD’s 2014 data on recorded use of officer force against citizens, made public for 
the PDI and the most comprehensive, publicly available use-of-force dataset. Use-of-force incidents 
included a range of physical responses to citizens’ failure to comply with officers’ verbal commands.  
Six general categories of force were distinguishable in the APD data: (1) weaponless use of hands or 
feet to target pressure points; (2) use of an impact weapon such as a baton; (3) use of a chemical agent 
such as pepper spray; (4) canine bites; (5) use of a conducted energy device (Taser) or less-lethal impact 
weapon, such as beanbag/rubber bullets; and (6) lethal firearm use. By far, the largest category of force 
used was (1), which comprised over two-thirds of force incidents. 
Following the NJD analytic framework, we applied a weighted severity scale to these force incident 
categories so use of a firearm, for example, was weighted more severely than use of a baton. 
Accordingly, the severity weighting consisted of a 6-point scale aligned with the six categories of force 
above (e.g., 1 = hands/body, 2 = impact weapon, 3 = pepper spray, 4 = canine, 5 = Taser/less-lethal 
weapon, 6 = lethal firearm). Higher scores corresponded with more severe levels of force. 
Throughout this section, we analyzed both the counts of force incidents as well as the severity of 
force incidents. As shown in Figure 10, both the counts and severity of APD force incidents remained 
fairly constant over time from January to December 2014.6 This finding is similar to that for the counts 
of APD vehicle stops in 2015. 
FIGURE 10 
Use-of-Force Incidents, 2014 
 
USE OF FORCE BY RACE OR ETHNICITY  
Figure 11 and Figure 12 display the counts and severity of force incident rates by citizen’s race or 
ethnicity (per 1,000 citizens). Racial disparities are evident when comparing the racial/ethnic 
composition of APD’s use-of-force incidents to the racial/ethnic composition of the Austin MSA. 
However, this descriptive analysis of differential exposure to use of force provides no insight on the 
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complex factors and characteristics that might give rise to such disparities. To explore those factors, 
more advanced statistical modeling was necessary, as advocated by the NJD analytic framework.  
FIGURE 11 FIGURE 12 
Use-of-Force Rates by Citizen Race Use-of-Force Severity Rates by Citizen Race 
or Ethnicity, 2014 or Ethnicity, 2014 
  
MODELING USE OF FORCE  
To better understand apparent disparities in APD’s citywide use of force, we tested the effect of 
neighborhood-level characteristics on the number of use-of-force incidents that occurred within a 
census tract, as well as the cumulative severity of force used in those same events.7  
For these two analyses, we aggregated use-of-force events/severity to the tract level, estimating 
the independent effects of six neighborhood and demographic characteristics on police use of force: 
Part I crime rate, median household income, percentage of college-educated residents, homeownership 
rate, percentage of black residents, and percentage of Hispanic residents.8 The first four of these 
characteristics represent theoretically relevant predictors of police use of force, and so they function as 
control variables in our models. The percentages of black and Hispanic residents help test whether 
disparities in police use of force persisted after controlling for those community characteristics.  
Both the model of use-of-force incidents and the model of use-of-force severity suggested that 
Austin’s neighborhoods with a higher percentage of black or Hispanic residents experienced a 
disproportionate amount of police use of force. The percentage of black and percentage of Hispanic 
residents in a neighborhood were statistically significant positive predictors of police use of force. The 
percentage of black residents in a neighborhood had a larger effect than percentage of Hispanic 
residents in both models. 
Median household income and crime rate were also impactful and statistically significant predictors 
of police use of force. The results of the use-of-force incidents model and the use-of-force severity 
model were largely the same. The statistically significant predictors—median household income, Part I 
crime rate, percentage of black residents, and percentage of Hispanic residents—were identical 
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between models. As one would expect, estimated effect sizes were larger for the force severity model 
because of the multiplicative severity-weighting procedure.  
According to the model of use-of-force incidents, a one-point rise in the percentage of black 
residents increased the expected number of use-of-force incidents by 2.6 percent, holding all other 
variables constant. The percentage of Hispanic residents had a smaller effect: a one-point rise in the 
percentage of Hispanic residents increased the expected number of use-of-force incidents by 1.1 
percent.  
Comparing effect sizes across all independent variables was challenging because the variables were 
measured in vastly different units. Using standard deviation units, we compared the estimated 
percentage change in use-of-force incidents uniformly. Increasing the percentage of black residents in a 
tract by a standard deviation—about 8 percent—led to a 24 percent increase in expected use-of-force 
incidents. By contrast, a standard deviation increase in the percentage of Hispanic residents—almost 22 
percent—led to a 27 percent increase in expected use-of-force incidents. 
A standard deviation increase in a tract’s Part I crime rate—an upswing of 50 crimes per 1,000 
residents—increased the expected number of use-of-force incidents by 92 percent. A standard 
deviation increase in median household income—a rise of $28,000—decreased the expected number of 
use-of-force incidents by 33 percent.  
FIGURE 13 FIGURE 14 
Estimated Percentage Change in Use-of-Force Estimated Percentage Change in Use-of-Force 
Incidents Resulting from a Percentage-Point  Incidents Resulting from a Standard Deviation 
Increase Increase 
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Lessons Learned 
This report is the first to apply NJD’s independent analytic framework to police data made available 
through the White House’s PDI. Although several limitations applied to the findings, as noted 
throughout, the analyses are encouraging because they represent the start of a more comprehensive 
and transparent effort to understand—and help correct—the degree of racial and ethnic disparities in 
policing practices. The information presented is beneficial to both community members and policing 
executives alike. 
As described earlier, the NJD analytic framework identifies three categories of explanation for 
racial disparities in policing: community level, police level, and relationship level. Given the limited 
availability of publicly available APD data, and that which is housed on the PDI portal, our analyses are 
only able to examine community-level explanations. Specifically, this brief analyzes racial disparities in 
APD police vehicle stops and use of force. The results are mixed.  
Analyses of vehicle stop data reveal three important findings. 
First, APD searches appear to be highly effective. Searches left to officer discretion (that is, not 
incidental to arrest) returned contraband roughly 48 percent of the time. While this result may stem in 
part from APD’s unusually stringent policy on consent searches, which require probable cause, it also 
may be the result of missing data. Given that APD does not publish data on all vehicle stops, an unknown 
number of vehicle stops and searches did not result in arrest. To address this omission, APD Chief Acevedo 
has instructed the department to collect and publish data on both pedestrian and vehicle stops that do not 
result in citation or arrest by January 2017.9 Presumably fewer of those searches end in arrest given the 
lack of contraband found. Still, the relatively high hit rate should be a goal of law enforcement, and 
APD’s available data suggest reasons for optimism. 
Second, there are racial disparities in the decision to stop and search a suspect. Both our models 
of decisionmaking around searches, the officer discretionary index and the probability of vehicle search 
model, reveal disparities by race. The ODI revealed that, for vehicle stops ending in citation or arrest, 
stopped black motorists made up a higher share of officer-discretionary stops than of stops mandated 
by citizen complaints or by statutes requiring officers to stop a citizen. Similarly, the ODI revealed that 
stopped white motorists made up a lower share of officer-discretionary stops. Finally, a model of the 
decision to search revealed that blacks and Hispanics, once stopped, were more likely to be searched 
than would be indicated by their representation among those stopped. These findings, however, are 
qualified by our final finding. 
Third, an analysis of racial disparities in hit rates revealed no reliable differences between blacks, 
whites, and Hispanics. While previous research demonstrates that this is not proof of the absence of 
bias,10 it is a positive indicator. Moreover, these findings suggest that racially disparate rates of vehicle 
stops may in fact be driven by differential rates of offending. 
The takeaway from these findings is that community-level explanations appear to account for a 
sizable amount in observed racial disparities. We encourage the APD to continue monitoring these 
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issues and to collect data on all its vehicle stops to assess the equity of officer behavior even more 
accurately. 
By contrast, analyses of use-of-force data revealed a more consistent picture of disparity. Even 
when controlling for neighborhood levels of crime, education, homeownership, income, youth, and 
unemployment, racial disparities in both use and severity of force remained. In other words, 
community-level explanations of use of force were Not in PDI to explain observed racial disparities in 
use of force. While crime, poverty, and other factors contributed to these disparities, controlling for 
these factors did not eliminate disproportionate use of force in communities with higher percentages of 
Hispanics and blacks.  
Still, these discrepancies are not direct evidence of racial prejudice. Rather, they suggest that 
police-level and/or relationship-level explanations of use-of-force incidents are also implicated. In other 
words, we advise APD to focus on police-level and relationship-level concerns to reduce racially 
disparate use of force. 
Common police-directed interventions to minimize racially disparate policing include trainings, 
particularly ones on how to identify and disarm unintended forms of bias (e.g., identity traps and/or 
implicit bias), policy reviews conducted by external auditors, and collaborative policy reviews with 
communities. Relationship-directed interventions highlight principles of procedural justice, particularly 
issues of community voice and police transparency.  
Importantly, the APD has recently attempted to promote transparency by instituting a policy 
governing the use of body-worn cameras. That someone may be terminated immediately if his or her 
camera is not activated during a deadly force incident (without appropriate justification) is a strong 
accountability metric. Similarly, new additions to APD’s disciplinary matrix on failure to report 
complaints (with termination recommended after a second infraction) are strong signals of 
accountability. APD has also stated that effective January 2017 it will include a form on the back of 
citations that affords citizens an avenue for both complaints and positive feedback following 
interactions with officers. Finally, APD’s leadership on issues of data transparency also signals a 
willingness to receive criticism and reform in line with the shared values of police and communities—of 
particular importance given recent concerns about nonreporting in Texas.11 
We recommend that APD continue each of these initiatives as well as engage the broader 
communities of Austin in collaborative efforts to reform and implement policies that reflect their shared 
values. We also encourage police and community collaboration to design metrics of accountability that 
are easily understood by the community and leveraged for change both inside the APD and in the Austin 
metropolitan area. 
The science of policing equity demonstrates clearly that collaboration between communities and 
police is necessary to rebuild trust and reduce the negative consequences that can result from racial 
disparities in police contacts.12 We encourage further pursuit of those collaborations and the use of 
these analyses as benchmarks for both racial equity and progress toward that goal. 
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1. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
2. See Nicola Persico and Petra Todd, “Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with 
an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita,” Economic Journal 116, no. 515 (2006): F351–67. 
3. Persico and Todd, “Generalising the Hit Rates Test.” 
4. Austin has a three-square-mile lake within the city limits. 
5. Although officers’ recording of whether a driver’s race was known before a vehicle stop was missing for 13 
percent of cases, including the variable did not alter the substantive effects of other factors in the model, and it 
was a significant predictor of vehicle search, so it was retained. Regarding the trustworthiness of the variable’s 
values, we note that officers’ were half as likely to indicate race was known (7 percent versus 15 percent) 
during nighttime (9:00 p.m.–2:00 a.m.) vehicle stops as during other hours of the day, and APD policies 
specified strict guidelines and consequences for failure to record accurate information for this variable. 
6. Use-of-force incidents are coded at the citizen level, meaning that an event consisting of two officers using 
force against one citizen, for example, is counted as a single use-of-force incident. Conversely, an event that 
consists of one officer using force on two citizens would be counted as two use-of-force incidents.  
7. Use-of-force incidents were weighted using the same schema as used previously.  
8. Those characteristics are taken from the 2010–14 American Community Survey five-year estimates. 
9. Chase Hoffberger, “APD to Collect More Data,” Austin Chronicle, April 8, 2016, 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2016-04-08/apd-to-collect-more-data/. 
10. Kate Antonovics and Brian G. Knight, “A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the Boston Police 
Department,” Review of Economics and Statistics 91, no. 1 (2009): 163–77. 
11. Lise Olsen, “In Texas and California, Policy Fail to Report Use-of-Force Fatalities from 2005–2015,” Houston 
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Texas-and-California-police-fail-to-report-9958631.php. 
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